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A co-actor’s intentionality has been suggested to be a key modulating factor for joint action
effects like the joint Simon effect (JSE). However, in previous studies intentionality has
often been confounded with agency defined as perceiving the initiator of an action as being
the causal source of the action. The aim of the present study was to disentangle the role
of agency and intentionality as modulating factors of the JSE. In Experiment 1, participants
performed a joint go/nogo Simon task next to a co-actor who either intentionally controlled
a response button with own finger movements (agency+/intentionality+) or who passively
placed the hand on a response button that moved up and down on its own as triggered by
computer signals (agency−/intentionality−). In Experiment 2, we included a condition in
which participants believed that the co-actor intentionally controlled the response button
with a Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) while placing the response finger clearly besides
the response button, so that the causal relationship between agent and action effect
was perceptually disrupted (agency−/intentionality+). As a control condition, the response
button was computer controlled while the co-actor placed the response finger besides the
response button (agency−/intentionality−). Experiment 1 showed that the JSE is present
with an intentional co-actor and causality between co-actor and action effect, but absent
with an unintentional co-actor and a lack of causality between co-actor and action effect.
Experiment 2 showed that the JSE is absent with an intentional co-actor, but no causality
between co-actor and action effect. Our findings indicate an important role of the co-
actor’s agency for the JSE. They also suggest that the attribution of agency has a strong
perceptual basis.
Keywords: joint Simon effect, joint action, social interaction, stimulus-response compatibility, agency
INTRODUCTION
As social beings, we are born into a social environment. Acting
in and interacting with our surroundings shapes our behavior
and cognition from the early beginning (Prinz, 2012). Previous
research on single subjects has enormously improved our under-
standing of how perception and action are linked (i.e., by sharing
common representations), how individuals select task-relevant
information, predict upcoming actions, and integrate predicted
effects of one’s own and others’ actions (Wilson and Knoblich,
2005). However, when and to what extent individuals mentally
represent their own and others’ actions is currently a matter of
debate in cognitive science (Liepelt and Prinz, 2011; Guagnano
et al., 2013; Welsh et al., 2013a,b).
One of themost popular paradigms to investigate the cognitive
processes representing joint action in humans is the joint go/nogo
Simon task (Sebanz et al., 2003), in which two individuals share
the standard Simon task (Simon and Rudell, 1967; Simon, 1969;
see Simon, 1990 for a review). In the standard Simon task, a single
participant carries out spatially defined responses, such as left and
right key presses, to non-spatial stimulus attributes (e.g., geo-
metric forms) that appear randomly to the left or right side of
a central fixation point. Even though stimulus location is com-
pletely task-irrelevant, responses are faster when they spatially
correspond to the stimulus position, a phenomenon known as the
Simon effect (see Hommel, 2011 for an overview).When the same
participant responds to only one of the two stimuli by pressing
for example the left key, thus rendering the task a go/nogo task,
there is typically no Simon effect observable (Hommel, 1996).
However, when the same go/nogo task is divided between two
co-acting participants, so that each of them performs comple-
mentary go/nogo responses next to each other, the Simon effect is
re-established across the dyad (Sebanz et al., 2003). This so-called
joint Simon effect (JSE) is typically explained by the assumption
that interacting individuals automatically co-represent the other
person’s action (action co-representation), so that performing the
Simon task with another person is functionally equivalent to per-
forming the entire standard two-choice Simon task alone (Sebanz
et al., 2003, 2005; Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006).
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Recent studies, however, showed that a Simon effect can also be
observed when replacing the human co-actor in a joint go/nogo
Simon task with an event-producing object, like a rotating wheel
(Dolk et al., 2011, Experiment 3), a Japanese waving cat or
a metronome (Dolk et al., 2013). Based on these findings, a
“referential-coding” account has been suggested as an alternative
explanation for the JSE. Given that self-generated and other-
generated actions are cognitively represented by their sensory
consequences, i.e., by using the same kinds of codes (Prinz, 1997;
Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel, 2013), the co-actor’s action can
be considered as just any other event that needs to be differen-
tiated for response coding (Guagnano et al., 2010; Dolk et al.,
2011, 2013; Dittrich et al., 2012). As a consequence, the percep-
tion of concurrently activated (and thus cognitively represented)
social or non-social events that share features with the events
that a person produces (i.e., action) introduces a discrimina-
tion problem: to enable proper task performance the participant
needs to discriminate between the event representations referring
to one’s own action and all other (concurrently) activated event
representations. According to the referential coding account, the
action discrimination problem can be resolved by emphasizing
processing on event features that discriminate best in a given task
context. As the relative spatial location of both alternative actions
(distributed to the left and right side) is the most obvious dis-
criminable event feature in the spatial Simon task, it provides
a reasonable reference for coding the individual’s own action
(the single button press) as left or right relative to the alterna-
tive event (Dolk et al., 2013). This referential coding of actions
in turn can lead to matches or mismatches between the spatial
stimulus features and the spatial response features—a necessary
condition for Simon effects to emerge (Kornblum et al., 1990;
Hommel et al., 2001; Liepelt et al., 2011, 2013; Dittrich et al.,
2013; Sellaro et al., 2013). Hence, referential coding assumes
that the presence of an alternative action event that shares fea-
tures with one’s own action event is necessary for the JSE to
occur, whereas the co-representation of the other’s task or task
rules is not.
According to the referential coding account, the need to dis-
criminate one’s own action event from alternative action events
via spatial coding should be stronger the more similar both action
events are (Colzato et al., 2012, 2013; Liepelt et al., 2012). In
turn, more pronounced spatial coding should lead to a larger JSE
(Guagnano et al., 2010; Dolk et al., 2011, 2013). Indeed, there
are several recent studies demonstrating that the size of the JSE
is modulated by a range of factors that are related to the sim-
ilarity between the participant and the co-actor. For example,
Tsai and Brass (2007) showed that the JSE only emerges when
participants share a go/nogo Simon task with a virtual human
co-actor (a video of a human hand), but not when the task
was shared with a non-human co-actor (a video of a wooden
hand). Stenzel et al. (2012) extended these findings by show-
ing that a reliable JSE is observed when a human person shared
a task with a real humanoid robot, but only when this person
believed that the robot was functioning in a human-like, bio-
logically inspired way, and not when the robot was believed to
function like a machine. Both studies suggest that a higher simi-
larity regarding the humanness of the participant and the co-actor
leads to a larger JSE. Furthermore, Müller et al. (2011a) showed
that actions of in-groupmembers, i.e., a white participant sharing
a task with a white virtual co-actor, produced a larger JSE than
actions of out-group members, i.e., a white participant sharing
a task with a black virtual co-actor. Other components refer-
ring to the quality of the interpersonal relationship between both
interacting individuals have also been shown to modulate the
size of the JSE. In a study by Hommel et al. (2009), for exam-
ple, the JSE was only present when two actors were in a positive
relationship, which might lead participants to perceive the other
person as being more similar to themselves. All of these stud-
ies provide evidence that a greater similarity between two actors
(e.g., regarding their humanness or groupmembership) leads to a
larger JSE.
Atmaca et al. (2011) investigated the role of conceptual similar-
ity between two co-actors defined in terms of similarity regarding
intentionality. They used a go/nogo version of the Erikson Flanker
task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) that participants performed
either alone or together with another person responding to the
nogo-stimuli of the participant. In the Flanker task, participants
respond to a central target letter that is flanked by task irrele-
vant letters to its left and right side. The flanking letters are either
the same as the target letter (e.g., SSSSS, compatible trial) or dif-
ferent (e.g., HHSHH, incompatible trial). Participants showed
a larger Flanker effect (i.e., faster responses in compatible than
incompatible trials) when performing the go/nogo Flanker task
together with another person than when performing the same
task alone—a phenomenon known as the joint Flanker effect.
When performing the task with a co-actor whose response button
was controlled by a computer (unintentional co-actor condition)
the Flanker effect was smaller than when performing the task with
a co-actor who actively controlled her response button (inten-
tional co-actor condition) (Atmaca et al., 2011, Experiment 4).
Atmaca and colleagues suggested that humans only form shared
task representations when perceiving another person as act-
ing intentionally. However, recently Dolk et al. (2014) could
show that—just like for the JSE—a joint Flanker effect can be
induced even if the human co-actor is replaced by an event-
producing object (a Japanese waving cat). The logic applied to
explain the joint Flanker effect with referential coding goes as
follows. As actions are coded on more dimensions in the pres-
ence of an event-producing human or object than in its absence,
response competition is increased, and hence behavioral effects
that rely on response competition (like the Flanker effect) are
enhanced.
In line with the findings by Atmaca et al. (2011) other stud-
ies have suggested that the intentionality of a co-actor is a key
conceptual feature modulating joint action effects with larger
effect sizes for intentional than unintentional co-actors (Tsai et al.,
2008; Müller et al., 2011b; Stenzel et al., 2012). The concept of
intentionality comprises components like belief, desire, inten-
tion and awareness (Malle and Knobe, 1997). All of these mental
states can be ascribed to other biological agents or technical sys-
tems that function according to biologically inspired algorithms,
but clearly not to objects. The assumption that joint action
effects can only be found for intentional co-actors is at odds
with the outlined findings showing emerging Simon or Flanker
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effects for non-human event-producing objects (Dolk et al., 2011,
Experiment 3; Dolk et al., 2013, 2014), and raises doubts in the
crucial role of intentionality for joint action. Whereas intention-
ality, by definition, cannot be ascribed to objects, objects can be
identified as the physical cause of an (action) effect (e.g., a tick-
ing metronome is the causal source of peep tones or a Japanese
cat the initiator of an arm movement). The process of identifying
an agent as the initiator or causal source of an action has been
defined as agency (Gallagher, 2000). In the present manuscript,
we define the process of perceiving the physical causality between
an initiator of an (action) effect and the effect, independently
of whether the initiator is a human agent, non-human agent or
object as the minimum-criterion of agency. The work of Albert
Michotte (1963) suggests that ascribing causality to two events
depends on perceptual features. In his famous launching effect, an
object (the so called launcher) moves in the direction of another
object, stops when making contact with it, whereupon the other
object starts to move. Whether the first object is regarded as
causing the movement of the second object has been found to
depend on different perceptual parameters like the speed with
which both objects move, the direction they move, and the time
interval between the movement offset of the first object and the
movement onset of the second. In light of these findings, and the
finding that identifying an agent as the cause of an action effect
is particularly likely when action and action effect appear in close
temporal proximity (Haggard et al., 2002; Moore and Haggard,
2008), the ascription of agency could critically rely on perceiv-
ing the causality between initiator and action effect. For example,
identifying a person as the initiator of a button press could rely on
seeing how the finger of the person moves down in order to press
the button.
In many previous studies that investigated the effects of inten-
tionality on joint action, intentionality and agency were con-
founded. That is, intentional co-actor’s could be clearly perceived
as being the initiator of the action effect, while unintentional co-
actor’s were clearly not the initiator of the action effect. Related to
this problem, intentional and unintentional experimental condi-
tions did not only differ in conceptual features (i.e., intentional-
ity), but often also regarding perceptual features. For example, in
the study by Atmaca et al. (2011) the response button of the inten-
tional co-actor differed in size, shape, and probably also in sound
from the response button of the unintentional co-actor. In both
conditions, response buttons were permanently visible to partic-
ipants while performing the task. An open question is whether
intentionality alone, in the absence of agency, can modulate joint
action effects like the JSE.
In the present study, we aimed to disentangle the role of inten-
tionality and agency inmodulating the JSE. Further, we controlled
for differences in perceptual features between manipulations of
intentionality. In Experiment 1, we aimed to replicate the find-
ings of Atmaca et al. (2011) for the joint go/nogo Simon effect
while controlling for perceptual differences between conditions
during task performance. We compared JSEs between a condi-
tion in which the co-actor intentionally controlled a response
button and could be perceived to be the agent of the action
(agency+/intentionality+ condition) and a condition in which
the co-actor acted unintentionally and was clearly not the agent
of the action, because the co-actor’s hand rested on a response
button that passively moved up and down on its own as trig-
gered by the computer, so that the physical causality between
the co-actor and the button movement was clearly disrupted
(agency−/intentionality− condition). During the experiment, we
controlled for perceptual differences (visual and auditory action
effects) between both conditions by using boxes covering the
hands of both persons and letting persons wear earplugs. In
Experiment 2, we again included a control condition in which
the co-actor acted unintentionally and was not the agent of
the computer controlled button press (agency−/intentionality−
condition). Performance in this condition was compared to a
condition in which the co-actor was believed to control the
response button with a Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) instead
of manual responses, so that the co-actor could be regarded
as intentionally controlling the response button, but the causal
relationship between co-actor and action effect could not be
perceived (agency−/intentionality+).
For Experiment 1, agency and intentionality make similar pre-
dictions. This would be a conceptual replication of the findings
of Atmaca et al. (2011) for the JSE (JSEagency+/intentionality+ >
JSEagency−/intentionality−). For Experiment 2, the predictions do
crucially differ for intentionality and agency. If the co-actor’s
intentionality is the underlying source for modulating joint
action effects, we predicted a larger JSE when the co-actor acts
intentionally than when the co-actor does not act intentionally
(JSEagency−/intentionality+ > JSEagency−/intentionality−). If, however,
agency is the modulating factor of the JSE, we expect no dif-
ferences in JSEs between conditions (JSEagency−/intentionality+ =
JSEagency−/intentionality−).
EXPERIMENT 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether a co-
actor’s agency and intentionality modulate the size of the JSE.
Different from Atmaca et al. (2011), we controlled for per-
ceptual differences between experimental conditions while par-
ticipants were performing the task. Participants performed a
joint go/nogo Simon task with a co-actor who either actively
controlled a response button and could clearly be perceived
as the agent of the button press (agency+/intentionality+
condition) or whose response button was controlled by the
computer so that the co-actor was not the agent of the but-
ton press (agency−/intentionality− condition). We expected a
larger JSE in the agency+/intentionality+ condition than in the
agency−/intentionality− condition.
METHODS
Participants
A total of 32 healthy volunteers participated in Experiment 1.
Sixteen participants were randomly assigned to the
agency+/intentionality+ condition (15 female, mean age =
23.3 years, SD = 4.8 years) and 16 participants to the
agency−/intentionality− condition (12 female, mean age =
21.7 years, SD = 2.8 years). All participants were right-handed,
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were naive with
regard to the hypothesis of the experiment, and received
compensation for their participation.
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Stimuli and apparatus
As stimuli we used a white square and a white diamond (2.2 ×
2.2◦, horizontal × vertical visual angle) on a black background,
which were presented 5.4◦ to the left or right of a centrally
presented white fixation cross (0.9 × 0.9◦). All stimuli were dis-
played on an 18-inch CRT monitor at a viewing distance of
approximately 60 cm.
For the agency+/intentionality+ condition we used two con-
ventional response keys (one for the participant and the other
for the co-actor). For the agency−/intentionality− condition we
used one conventional response key for the participant and one
response key that could be moved up and down by a trigger sig-
nal from the computer for the co-actor. Both response keys were
placed 5 cm in front of the monitor and 27 cm from the midline
of the monitor.
Task and procedure
The participant was always seated on the left side of the
monitor and the co-actor (a confederate) on the right side
(Figure 1). Both persons were asked to place their right
index finger on the response button in front of them. The
participant responded to the square, whereas the co-actor
responded to the diamond. Participants either performed the
task with a co-actor who actively controlled the response button
(agency+/intentionality+ condition) or with a co-actor whose
response button was controlled by the computer via trigger sig-
nals (agency−/intentionality− condition) (Figure 1). In the latter
condition, the co-actor passively placed her index finger on the
response button, which was automatically pulled down every time
it was the co-actor’s turn to respond. The response latency of the
computer controlled response button varied randomly between
280, 320, and 360ms. The participant actively controlled his/her
response button in both conditions. Participants were randomly
assigned to conditions.
As the conventional and the computer controlled response
button differed in size and shape, response keys were covered with
black boxes before the experimental task started to control for
visual differences between both conditions during task perfor-
mance (Figure 1). In addition, the participant and the co-actor
wore earplugs in both conditions in order to control for the dif-
ferent sounds of the conventional and the computer controlled
response key.
The instruction given to the co-actor was audible to partici-
pants in both conditions. In the agency+/intentionality+ condi-
tion, the instruction for the co-actor was to press the response
button whenever a diamond appeared on the screen. In the
agency−/intentionality− condition, the co-actor was instructed
to position her response finger on the response button located in
front of her. The co-actor was informed that the stimulus com-
puter sent a trigger signal to start the movement of the button
whenever a diamond appeared thereby controlling the response
button. To familiarize participants with the task, the experiment
started with a short instruction phase including the presentation
of the two stimuli, their assignment to both actors, as well as
the presentation of the conventional and the computer controlled
response key. For the practice phase, the box that covered the
hands during the experiment was removed so that the participant
FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup used in Experiment 1. The participant
(sitting on the left side of the monitor) shared a joint go/nogo Simon task
with a co-actor (confederate) who either intentionally controlled a response
button, and could be perceived as the initiator of the button press
(agency+/intentionality+ condition) or whose response button was
controlled by the computer so that the co-actor was not the initiator of the
button press and did not respond intentionally (agency−/intentionality−
condition). Perceptual differences between the response button of the
actively responding co-actor and the computer controlled response button
were controlled for during task performance by covering response hands
and letting both persons wear earplugs, so that the setup shown on the
picture applies to both, the agency+/intentionality+ and the
agency−/intentionality− condition.
could clearly see that the co-actor actively responded in the
agency+/intentionality+ condition, whereas the response button
moved on its own when receiving a signal from the computer in
the agency−/intentionality− condition.
There were two blocks of 64 trials separated by short breaks
of 2min. The two target stimuli appeared equally often in the
left and right location which resulted in a total of 32 Stimulus-
Response (S-R) compatible trials and 32 S-R incompatible trials
for each person. The order of trials was randomized. Each trial
began with the presentation of the fixation cross for 1000ms.
Afterwards the target stimulus was displayed together with the fix-
ation cross for 150ms. The response had to be given within a time
interval of 1800ms following stimulus offset during which the fix-
ation cross was displayed. Following a response, feedback about
the accuracy was provided for 300ms: correct responses were
followed by the fixation cross, incorrect responses by the word
“Fehler” (error), and too slow responses by “zu langsam” (too
slow). In the inter-trial-interval the fixation cross was displayed
for 1000ms.
As a manipulation check verifying that there is a difference
between both conditions regarding the intentionality attributed
to the co-actor, participants rated the items “The other person
acted intentionally” (Item 1) and “The other person decided
actively when to respond to a stimulus” (Item 2) after the exper-
iment. Both items were rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging
from 0 (= I strongly disagree) to 4 (= I strongly agree) with
2 indicating neither agreement nor disagreement. Participants
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in the agency+/intentionality+ condition showed significantly
higher mean rating scores for both items than participants in the
agency−/intentionality− condition [Item 1: 2.4 vs. 0.8, t(30) =
3.64, p = 0.001; Item 2: 3.1 vs. 0.7, t(30) = 7.24, p < 0.0001].
RESULTS
In accordance with previous studies (Röder et al., 2007; Liepelt
et al., 2011), we excluded all trials in which responses were
incorrect (1.5%), faster than 150ms or slower than 1000ms
(0%) prior to the statistical analysis of reaction times (RTs).
Responses were coded as compatible (stimulus ipsilateral to the
correct response side) or incompatible (stimulus contralateral to
the correct response side). We calculated a repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for RTs and errors with the within-
subjects factor compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and
the between-subjects factor condition (agency+/intentionality+,
agency−/intentionality−). The JSE was calculated by subtracting
mean RTs in compatible trials from mean RTs in incompatible
trials. Additionally, we calculated Bayesian probabilities associ-
ated with the occurrence of the null (H0) and alternative (H1)
hypotheses, given the observed data (see Wagenmakers, 2007;
Masson, 2011). This method allows making inferences about
both significant and non-significant effects by providing the exact
probability of their occurrence, with values ranging from 0 (i.e.,
no evidence) to 1 (i.e., very strong evidence; see Raftery, 1995 for
a coarse classification).
Reaction times
The 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of compati-
bility, F(1, 30) = 14.22, p = 0.001, partial η2 = 0.32, p(H1|D) >
0.99, indicating faster responses for S-R compatible trials
(352ms) than incompatible trials (361ms). More importantly,
the compatibility effect differed for the two conditions as indi-
cated by a significant interaction of compatibility and condition,
F(1, 30) = 6.55, p = 0.02, partial η2 = 0.18, p(H1|D) = 0.99.
Newman-Keuls post-hoc analyses revealed that the difference
between compatible and incompatible trials was significant in the
agency+/intentionality+ condition (16ms, p < 0.001, d = 0.93)
but not in the agency-/intentionality- condition (3ms, p = 0.40,
d = 0.29) (Figure 2). There was no significant main effect of con-
dition, F(1,30) < 1, p = 0.96, partial η2 < 0.001, p(H0|D) = 0.85.
Error rates
The main effects of compatibility, F(1, 30) < 1, p = 0.90, par-
tial η2 = 0.001, p(H0|D) = 0.85, and condition, F(1, 30) < 1, p =
0.68, partial η2 = 0.006, p(H0|D) = 0.84, as well as the inter-
action of compatibility and condition, F(1, 30) = 1.40, p = 0.25,
partial η2 = 0.04, p(H0|D) = 0.73, were not significant.
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1, we observed a significant JSE when inter-
acting with a co-actor who actively controlled the response
button (agency+/intentionality+ condition), but found no sig-
nificant JSE when the co-actor’s response button was con-
trolled by the computer (agency−/intentionality− condition).
The JSE in the agency+/intentionality+ condition was signif-
icantly enlarged as compared to the agency−/intentionality−
FIGURE 2 | Mean reaction times for Experiment 1. Depicted are
compatible (light gray) and incompatible (dark gray) trials for the
agency+/intentionality+ condition (left panel) and the
agency−/intentionality− condition (right panel). Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean differences (Pfister and Janczyk, 2013).
condition, conceptually replicating the findings of Atmaca et al.
(2011) for the joint go/nogo Simon effect. So, even in the absence
of perceptual differences between co-acting agents, past percep-
tion of physical causality between co-actor and action effect
and/or the ascription of intentionality to the co-actor appear to be
sufficient in modulating the size of the JSE. Given that intention-
ality and agency were clearly confounded in this experiment, in a
second experiment we aimed at separating both aspects by vary-
ing the co-actor’s intentionally between conditions while keeping
the physical causality between co-actor and action effect constant.
EXPERIMENT 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to disentangle the effects of inten-
tionality and agency on the JSE. We included a condition, in
which the co-actor was believed to intentionally control the
response button, but the causal relationship between agent and
action effect could not be perceived, so that physical causality
was disrupted (agency−/intentionality+ condition). In this con-
dition, the co-actor was equipped with a cap used to measure
electroencephalography (EEG) activity including two electrodes
over the motor cortex. Participants were made to believe that the
co-actor controlled the response button via a BCI by generating
motor potentials whenever it was the co-actor’s turn to respond.
We again compared the size of the JSE in this condition to a
condition in which the co-actor passively placed her finger on a
computer controlled response button (agency−/intentionality−
condition). In this condition, participants were told that the co-
actor was wearing an EEG cap in order to measure electrical
potentials in a motor observation task. To fully eliminate any per-
ceptual differences between the agency−/intentionality+ and the
agency−/intentionality− condition, the co-actor’s response but-
ton was identical for both conditions (see Figure 3, co-actor side),
so that only the belief about the co-actor’s intentionality differed
between conditions.
If the co-actor’s intentionality modulated the size of the JSE
in the previous experiment, we would expect a similar response
time pattern as in Experiment 1 with a larger JSE when the
co-actor acts intentionally than when acting unintentionally
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FIGURE 3 | Experimental setup used in Experiment 2. The participant
(left side) shared a joint go/nogo Simon task with a co-actor (confederate,
right side) wearing an EEG cap with electrodes attached to the motor
cortex, and placing the finger underneath the moving part of a response
device. The participant was either told that the confederate intentionally
controlled the response button via a BCI so that the causal relationship
between co-actor and action effect was not perceivable
(agency−/intentionality+ condition) or that the response button was
controlled by the computer (agency−/intentionality− condition). As the
same response button was used for the co-actor in the
agency−/intentionality+ and the agency−/intentionality− condition, the
setup shown on the picture applies to both conditions.
(JSEagency−/intentionality+ > JSEagency−/intentionality−). If, however,
the modulation of the JSE in Experiment 1 was driven by
agency, we expect JSEs of comparable size in both conditions
(JSEagency−/intentionality+ = JSEagency−/intentionality−).
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-two new healthy volunteers participated in
Experiment 2. Sixteen participants were assigned to the
agency−/intentionality+ condition (13 female, mean age = 23.5
years, SD = 3.7 years) and 16 to the agency−/intentionality−
condition (12 female, mean age = 23.9 years, SD = 2.3 years).
All participants fulfilled the same criteria as participants in
Experiment 1 and were treated in the same way.
Stimuli and apparatus
Stimuli and apparatus were the same as in Experiment 1. The
co-actor (a confederate) wore an EEG cap equipped with one elec-
trode over the left and one over the right motor cortex (Figure 3).
The cable of the electrodes was connected to a box placed on the
right side of the monitor (Figure 3). Participants were told that
this box was connected to the stimulus computer, analyzing the
electrical signals measured over the motor cortex.
Task and procedure
Task and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1
with the following exceptions concerning the co-actor. In
both, the agency−/intentionality+ and agency−/intentionality−
condition, the computer controlled response button was placed
in front of the co-actor, and the co-actor passively placed her
right hand on the response device (Figure 3). Note that in both
conditions the finger of the co-actor was positioned about 2 cm
below the moving part of the response device (Figure 3) in
order to avoid any movements of the co-actor’s finger which
could have led to the false assumption that the co-actor was
controlling the response button by finger movements. As the
agency−/intentionality+ and the agency−/intentionality− con-
dition were therefore perceptually identical, the left and the right
response button were visible during the entire experiment. To
manipulate the agency of the co-actor, we used a belief manip-
ulation: in the agency−/intentionality+ condition, participants
were told that the co-actor controlled the response button via
a BCI. They were told that the co-actor had undergone multi-
ple training sessions to be able to generate motor potentials by
imagining a button press with the right index finger. Whenever
these motor potentials measured over the motor cortex exceeded
a certain threshold, a signal was sent to the response device as a
starting signal to move. Hence, participants were led to believe
that the co-actor intentionally controlled the response device via
brain signals, but the physical causality between co-actor and
action effect could not be perceived as the co-actor’s finger was
clearly placed below the response button on the response device.
In the agency−/intentionality− condition, participants were told
that the computer controlled the response button. As a cover
story to explain why the co-actor wore an EEG cap during in
the agency−/intentionality− condition, we explained that the
study was about action observation of human and non-human
actions, and that the goal of the study was to compare motor
potentials elicited by the observation of a human response (the
button press of the participant) to those elicited by the observa-
tion of a non-human response (the computer controlled response
device). In both conditions, the experimenter presented pictures
while instructing in order to support the belief manipulation. In
the agency−/intentionality+ condition, participants were shown
a schematic illustration of the BCI principle and a picture of
a child using a BCI to operate a cursor on a monitor. In the
agency−/intentionality− condition, the participant and the co-
actor were shown a schematic illustration of an electrode over
the cortex to explain the principle of measuring evoked poten-
tials. In addition, a picture was shown in which a man equipped
with an EEG cap observed a picture of a hand posture. Actually,
in both conditions the response button was controlled by the
computer.
We used the same manipulation check as in Experiment 1.
Participants in the agency−/intentionality+ condition showed
significantly higher rating scores for both items than partici-
pants in the agency−/intentionality− condition [Item 1: 2.3 vs.
0.8, t(30) = 3.22, p = 0.003; Item 2: 2.6 vs. 0.8, t(30) = 3.75, p =
0.001] indicating that the belief manipulation was successful.
RESULTS
For the statistical analyses of RTs, we again excluded all tri-
als in which responses were incorrect (0.9%), faster than
150ms or slower than 1000ms (0%). We calculated a
repeated measure ANOVA for RTs and errors with the within-
subjects factor compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and
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FIGURE 4 | Mean reaction times for Experiment 2. Depicted are
compatible (light gray) and incompatible (dark gray) trials for the
agency−/intentionality+ condition (left panel) and the
agency−/intentionality− condition (right panel). Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean differences (Pfister and Janczyk, 2013).
the between-subjects factor condition (agency−/intentionality+,
agency−/intentionality−). As in Experiment 1, Bayesian prob-
abilities associated with the occurrence of H0 and H1 were
calculated.
Reaction times
The main effect of compatibility was not significant, F(1, 30) < 1,
p = 0.33, partial η2 = 0.03, p(H0|D) = 0.77, indicating com-
parable response times for S-R compatible trials (362ms) and
incompatible trials (365ms) (Figure 4). The main effect of con-
dition, F(1, 30) < 1, p = 0.54, partial η2 = 0.01, p(H0|D) = 0.82,
as well as the interaction between compatibility and condition,
F(1, 30) < 1, p = 0.69, partial η2 = 0.006, p(H0|D) = 0.84, were
not significant.
Error rates
The main effect of compatibility, F(1, 30) = 4.2, p = 0.049, partial
η2 = 0.12, but p(H1|D) = 0.60, was significant indicating fewer
errors for compatible (0.6%) than incompatible trials (1.3%).
The main effect of condition, F(1, 30) < 1, p = 0.78, partial η2 =
0.003, p(H0|D) = 0.84, as well as the interaction of compati-
bility and condition, F(1, 30) < 1, p = 0.77, partial η2 = 0.003,
p(H0|D) = 0.84, were not significant.
DISCUSSION
In line with the results from Experiment 1, no JSE was observed
when participants assumed that the co-actor’s response button
was controlled by the computer (agency−/intentionality− condi-
tion). Importantly and different from Experiment 1, no JSE was
induced by the co-actor who intentionally controlled her response
button via a BCI, but the causal relationship between agent and
action effects could not be perceived. As the results of the post-
experimental ratings suggest that our belief manipulation was
successful (i.e., participants stated that the co-actor acted inten-
tionally in the agency−/intentionality+ condition), we conclude
that agency—perceiving the co-actor as being the causal source of
an action effect—seems to be a critical factor for the JSE.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present study, we aimed to disentangle the role of agency
and intentionality for the JSE. Whereas differences in intention-
ality were confounded with differences in agency in previous
studies (e.g., Tsai and Brass, 2007; Atmaca et al., 2011), we aimed
to solely test the effects of intentionality on joint action.
In Experiment 1, actively responding participants performed
a joint go/nogo Simon task with a co-actor who responded
actively or a co-actor whose response button was controlled by the
computer. While controlling for perceptual differences between
both conditions during task performance, participants had the
opportunity to clearly perceive how the response button was con-
trolled in each condition prior to task performance. When the
participant and the co-actor both acted intentionally and phys-
ical causality could be perceived the JSE was highly significant,
whereas no JSE was observed when the co-actor did not respond
intentionally and physical causality was disrupted. In Experiment
2, we again included a condition in which the co-actor’s response
button was controlled by the computer, and the co-actor clearly
was not the agent of the action effect. Performance in this
condition was compared to a condition in which the co-actor
controlled the response button intentionally via a BCI placing
the response finger clearly below the button, so that the phys-
ical causality between co-actor and action effect was disrupted.
In line with Experiment 1, we observed no JSE when the co-
actor was believed to respond unintentionally and was not the
agent of the button press (agency−/intentionality− condition).
However, different from Experiment 1 no JSE was found for the
intentional co-actor when participants did not perceive that the
co-actor caused the button press, even though post-experimental
questionnaires indicated that the co-actor was believed to inten-
tionally control the response button via the BCI. These results
suggest that perceiving the co-actor at least once as being the
causal source of responses seems to be a necessary prerequi-
site for the emergence of a JSE in a real (vis-à-vis) interaction,
and point to the co-actor’s agency as a modulating factor for
joint action effects. Intentionality alone does not seem to be suf-
ficient to induce a JSE. Only when physical causality between
co-actor and action effect can be perceived, a JSE seems to be
observed.
In the present study, we did not include a condition in
which the co-actor was the causal source of action effects, but
acted unintentionally (i.e., a agency+/intentionality− condition).
However, this condition has already been tested in previous
studies using different event-producing objects that replaced the
co-actor in joint action tasks (e.g., Dolk et al., 2011, 2013, 2014).
By definition, intentionality cannot be ascribed to objects, but
the objects used in these studies were the causal source of the
respective (action) effects (e.g., the tone originated from the
metronome), so physical causality between object and action
effect was clearly present. Under these conditions a JSE has con-
sistently been found, suggesting that agency can induce a JSE in
the absence of intentionality.
Our findings are in line with the referential coding account
(Dolk et al., 2011, 2013) predicting that a higher similarity (con-
ceptual and perceptual) between alternative action events should
lead to a larger JSE. When the participant’s and the co-actor’s
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 595 | 7
Stenzel et al. Perceived agency and joint action
action events were highly similar with regards to their conceptual
features (i.e., both actors responded intentionally) and perceptual
features (i.e., physical causality could be perceived for both actors)
the JSE was highly significant, whereas no JSE was observed
when both persons were dissimilar (i.e., the participant still acted
intentionally and physically caused the action effect, but the co-
actor acted unintentionally and physical causality was disrupted).
A higher similarity between the action events of both actors
induced a (stronger) discrimination problem, which could be
resolved by emphasizing spatial action features leading to a JSE.
In contrast, the need to emphasize discriminable action features
seemed to be weaker and cognitively less demanding when the
action features of the co-actor were clearly distinct. Interestingly,
conceptual features alone (i.e., intentionality) did not induce a
JSE, whereas similarity regarding perceptual features (i.e., visible
physical causality) seems to be sufficient to induce a JSE (Dolk
et al., 2011, 2013).
A study by Stenzel et al. (2012) compared the size of the JSE in
a joint Simon task shared with a robot that was believed to func-
tion in a human-like way to a task shared with a robot believed
to be controlled by the stimulus computer, and thus to function
like a machine. In line with the present results, a JSE was present
for the human-like robot which was believed to respond inten-
tionally (i.e., the decision to respond was calculated by a neural
network integrated in the robot’s body on the basis of visual infor-
mation recorded by the robot’s cameras), and for which agency
was clearly present (i.e., participants could see how the robot
moved its finger down to press the response button). In contrast,
for the machine-like robot, to which intentionality could not be
ascribed (i.e., participants believed that responses were controlled
by a fixed sequence of trigger signals originating from the stim-
ulus computer, which was located outside of the robotic agent),
no JSE was observed. As the machine-like robot condition was
perceptually identical to the human-like robot condition, partic-
ipants could see how the finger of the machine-like robot moved
down to press the button, so that—based solely on these visual
information—agency could also be attributed to the machine-
like robot, and hence a JSE should have been observed. However,
due to the belief manipulation used in the robot study the causal
source of the action was spatially shifted away from the machine-
like robot to the stimulus computer, which was located outside
of the robot, so that based on this knowledge the robot could
not be regarded as the causal source of the action. That is, the
verbal instruction given to the participant disrupted the physi-
cal causality between robot and action effect, which could explain
why no JSE was observed for this robot. From the perspective of
the present findings, the finding of a JSE for the human-like robot
may be better interpreted as the result of an interplay between
intentionality and agency, and not solely on intentionality.
An interesting question for future research is whether
gaining experience with a BCI would lead to a JSE in
an agency−/intentionality+ condition like the one used in
Experiment 2. As most people are currently not experienced in
using BCIs, it might be rather difficult to get a notion of how a
person using a BCI accomplishes it to control a response device
solely based on the information provided by the experimenter.
This might be especially hard because of two reasons. First, the
ascription of physical causality seems to be strongly perceptu-
ally grounded (Michotte, 1963), so that the ascription of agency
might be hard when the causality between agent and action effect
cannot be perceived. Second, for human actors with whom we
usually interact on a daily basis from very early age on, and on
the basis of being humans ourselves, we had the opportunity to
develop a fixed notion about how humans usually control actions,
so that it might be difficult to get rid of this notion and develop
a new understanding of action control using newly developed
methods such as BCI. If participants would gain more experience
in using BCIs themselves, i.e., gaining perceptual experience in
controlling a given device with brain signals, knowing about the
physical causality of such action-effect relations may foster recog-
nizing a person using a BCI as being the initiator of action effects
even in the absence of any directly perceived causality. This in
turn might induce a JSE in a BCI condition like the one used in
Experiment 2.
Based on the present findings we would argue that the concept
of agency might be better suited than the concept of intentional-
ity to explain the modulatory findings of the JSE in the previous
study and potentially in previous studies using human co-actors
(e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005; Vlainic et al., 2010; Liepelt
et al., 2011), non-human co-actors (Müller et al., 2011b; Stenzel
et al., 2012), and objects (Dolk et al., 2011, Experiment 3; Dolk
et al., 2013, 2014). In contrast to intentionality, the attribution of
agency—identifying the causal source of an (action) effect—can
be applied to biological agents as well as to non-biological agents
and objects (Pickering, 1995). As long as a human, a robot or an
object is the causal source of an (action) effect and this causal
relationship is clearly perceivable, and not otherwise disrupted by
instruction, a joint action effect can be observed. Of course this
is not to say that agency is the only modulating factor of joint
action effects. Other factors that surely determine the size of the
JSE refer to the degree of similarity on a perceptual level between
the participant’s and the co-actor’s action effects (Sellaro et al.,
under revision) or the degree of similarity on more abstract lev-
els like the personal relationship between both actors (Hommel
et al., 2009).
Taken together, the results of the present study suggest that
a co-actor’s agency has a reliable influence on the joint go/nogo
Simon effect. Further, our results suggest that in order to ascribe
agency to an initiator of action effects, the causal relationship
between the initiator and the action effect must be perceived
(Michotte, 1963) suggesting a perceptual grounding of physical
causality ascription.
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